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Japanese “New Imperial History” in Comparative Perspective
The Cases of Okinawan and Taiwanese Migrations
Hiroko Matsuda 
Introduction
The subject of this workshop is “Migration and Colonization in the 19th century World”. However, 
this paper is not about the migration and colonization in the 19th century world simply because the 
Japanese colonial empire did not rise until the late 19th century, and migrations became popular 
among common Japanese only after the turn of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the study of Japanese 
migration and colonization in the 20th century world might help people reconsider what the 
phrase “the 19th century world” means, and to question how we can critically utilize the concepts 
developed by the British “new imperial history” to compare different colonizations and migrations 
beyond the British empire. This paper first elucidates the characteristics of Japanese colonial 
empire in comparison; the second part demonstrates the case studies of colonial migrations across 
Japanese colonial empire — Okinawan migration to colonial Taiwan and Taiwanese migration 
to Manchukuo. By doing so, the paper aims to discuss some implications of the “new imperial 
history” to contemporary studies of Japanese imperial history.  
Japanese Colonialism in Comparison
Japan colonized or otherwise militarily occupied countries and regions that were geographically 
proximate. Geographical proximity also meant that the racial distinction between the Japanese and 
other Asians was blurred, at least at the anthropological level. After all, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 
other East Asian countries were, for centuries, more or less under the great influence of Chinese 
civilization. Thus, when the Japanese first occupied Taiwan, Japanese militants, who apparently 
did not know how to speak the native language, were able to communicate with Taiwanese people 
in written Chinese. Such occasion may not have been observed when British colonized the Asian 
countries at the first instance.  
The regional dimension of Japanese imperialism also leads us to ponder the timing of 
Japanese imperialism. In the late 19th century the Japanese politicians’ primary concern was 
not to colonize neighboring countries, but to escape from European colonization and to 
establish a centralized nation-state. Later, Japan ruled the South Sea Islands, which became 
the League of Nations Mandate after WWI, and effectively controlled Manchukuo between 
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1932 and 1945. In summary, Japanese imperialism and colonial migrations took place while 
colonialism had already lost its legitimacy, and national self-determination became the center 
of world political discourse. Yet, it does not mean that Japanese colonialism was essentially 
unique in comparison to European empires during the 19th and the 20th centuries. Indeed, 
Japanese imperialism was in sharp contrast with British imperialism in many ways. However, 
when including the Russian, German, and French empires in comparison, it is clear that Japan 
was not the only modern empire that colonized countries and regions that were racially akin 
and geographically proximate. Some scholars categorize Japanese imperialism as “continental 
imperialism”, borrowed from Hanna Arendt’s discussion on German imperialism in Europe. 
Although there is a risk of missing out historical details of different imperial histories, such 
labeling might be helpful for scholars to compare different imperial histories in the world of the 
19th and the 20th centuries. 
Each colony had a particular relationship to its metropole, and the circumstances of 
each colonization were different. Still, there are several different patterns of Japanese colonial 
migrations in relation to the roles of the metropolitan state’s authority and military in mobilizing 
civilian migration. For instance, a significant number of Japanese civilians migrated to the 
Korean peninsula before the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910(1). In contrast, no Japanese 
on record migrated to Taiwan prior to the Sino-Japanese War. In other words, the state played 
a vital role in initiating Japanese migration to Taiwan although the Government-General was 
unsuccessful in mobilizing Japanese civilians to settle down in Taiwan. In the early stage of 
colonization, the Japanese colonial government inaugurated the agricultural migration project 
and recruited Japanese farmers to cultivate Taiwan’s soil. However, the project ended in failure, 
and few Japanese farmers settled in Taiwan. By contrast, the Japanese government played a great 
role in mobilizing Japanese farmers and sending them to Manchukuo in the 1930s(2). I should 
also note that some countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian 
nations, were briefly controlled by the Japanese military in the early 1940s. A significant number 
of Japanese civilians resided in these countries before the Japanese military rule, and their status 
and circumstances were greatly changed during the Japanese military occupation. 
In summary, the Japanese state’s authority played diverse roles in mobilizing Japanese 
civilians to settle in colonized territories. Still, generally speaking, the Japanese government and 
the political leaders tended to think civilian Japanese migration to the colonies was favorable 
and should be promoted for several reasons. First, there was a social fear of overpopulation and a 
shortage of agricultural land in the Japanese Islands. Both the Japanese government and opinion 
makers believed that migration was the only solution to this problem. Second, the Japanese 
government initially promoted international migrations to North America to solve the issue 
(1) Uchida Jun, Broker of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945, Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
(2) Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1998.
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of overpopulation, but the anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. and Canada eventually closed 
the door to Japanese labor migrants. Having observed Japanese migrants being expelled from 
the U.S., Canada, and Australia, the Japanese government was convinced that the Japanese 
citizens should migrate to its own colonies in Asia, where there was no need for fear of racial 
discrimination and expulsion. 
Third, the Japanese government believed that Japanese settlement in the colonies would 
contribute to the assimilation of the native population into the Japanese culture. It is difficult to 
elucidate the details of the assimilation policy in the Japanese colonies because racial discourse 
altered from time to time, and there were no consistent cultural policies in the Japanese colonial 
empire. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that geographical and racial proximity between the 
colonies and the metropole set the precondition of its cultural policies.  
It should be important to note that the Japanese tended to consider their colonies as a 
security border zone because of their geographical proximity. In other words, the government 
expected the colonized population to fight for and defend the Japanese border in case of war. 
Conversely, the Japanese continued to maintain the racial boundaries between themselves and 
the others; this was a fundamental aspect of colonial rule. In practice, the Japanese government 
utilized the family registry (koseki) to administer all national and colonial subjects. The family 
registry recorded all births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. In the Japanese empire, nationals 
who were registered in metropolitan Japan, including Okinawa, held the domestic registry; 
those who were registered outside of Japan, held the external registries. Indeed, the Japanese 
family registry was like a racial package that contained actual people who had various racial, 
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic attributes. Because the domestic and external registries were not 
legally inter-connected, the Japanese and Taiwanese were not officially allowed to get married, 
although the Japanese government thought that a marriage between a Japanese and Taiwanese 
citizen would promote Taiwanese assimilation to Japan. This indicates that the meaning of 
inter-racial marriage in colonial contexts varies, depending not only on the metropolitan 
government’s policies, but also on the racial discourse and institutions that were embedded in 
local-context and created through history(3).        
Imperial Careering in Japanese Colonial Empire 
Like other imperial history studies, scholars of the Japanese empire did not pay much attention 
to civilian migrations to the colonies until the 1980s. However, as social and cultural histories 
became integrated into imperial history study, civilian migrations came to be the focus of serious 
historical studies. Besides this, contemporary scholars of Japanese imperial history are increasingly 
interested in the inter-relationships between different colonies, rather than investigating the bi-
(3) For the study of interethnic marriage in Taiwan, see Barclay Paul D., ‘Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in 
Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and their Aborigine Wives, 1895-1930’, in Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 64, no.2, 2005. 
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lateral relationship between a metropole and a colony(4). The final part of this paper demonstrates 
two cases of movements of people that tend to be neglected in the political history of the Japanese 
empire. The first case is the Okinawan migration to Taiwan, and the second is the Taiwanese 
migration to Manchuria. Both migrations took place in the early twentieth century, when Japan 
colonized Taiwan and aggressively extended its influence over northeastern China. I suggest that 
these two cases should be understood in terms of “imperial careering”, which is also utilized in 
contemporary British imperial history.
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, at which time 
the number of Japanese settlers continuously increased until the fall of the Japanese empire. 
When Japan lost WWII in August 1945, there were approximately 350,000 Japanese civilians 
and military personnel in Taiwan, nearly 30,000 of whom had registered their addresses in the 
Okinawa prefecture. Some of these settlers had emigrated from Okinawa before WWII started; 
some were drafted and came to Taiwan as a member of the Japanese military; and others were 
born in Taiwan as second or third generation Okinawan immigrants. 
The terms “Okinawan” and “Ryukyuans” were powerful signifiers used to downgrade a 
certain group of people. Indeed, while Okinawa is considered the representative ethnic minority 
of the modern Japanese nation, numerous scholars have studied how Okinawa was the victim 
of political, social, and cultural discriminations and the illusion of Japan as a “homogeneous 
nation”(5). The circumstances of Okinawans in the Japanese colonial empire are best compared 
to those of the Irish in the British colonial empire. It has been pointed out that there are some 
commonalities between the two — both were colonized by people who were racially akin to 
them and who were, in fact, their geographically proximate neighbor; both sent a number of 
emigrants overseas against a backdrop of poverty, underdevelopment, and increasing population. 
Ireland is often deemed the first “victim” of British colonial expansion. Yet recent developments 
in “new British imperial history” have revealed that the Irish, as merchants, adventurers, soldiers, 
administrators, missionaries, and other professionals, played an active role in the expansion of 
the British Empire(6). This refreshed viewpoint is certainly helpful in understanding Okinawa’s 
ambivalent position as “not only a half-hearted colony,” but “also a half-hearted component of 
the imperial metropolis”(7). 
While the Japanese population steadily increased throughout its colonial rule, the growth 
(4) See, for example, Thornber, Karen Laura, Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Tranculturations of Japanese 
Literature, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009; Yang, Daqing, Technology of Empire: Telecommunications 
and Japanese Expamsion in Asia, 1883-1945, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
(5) See, for example, Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the 
United States, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012; Eiji Oguma, The Boundaries of ‘the Japanese’: 
Volume 1: Okinawa 1818-1972, translated by Leonie R. Stickland, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2014.
(6) See Barry Crosbie, Irish Imperial Network: Migration, Social Communication and Exchange in Nineteenth-Century India, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Kevin Kenny ed., Ireland and the British Empire, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
(7) Alvin Jackson, “Ireland, the Union, and the Empire, 1800-1960”, in Kenny, ed., Ireland and the British Empire, 136.
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rate of the Okinawan population rose higher especially from the mid-1920s to the mid-
1940s. This time, when the total number of emigrants particularly increased in the Okinawa 
prefecture, also greatly suffered from an economic depression. The backgrounds of Okinawan 
migrants were indeed diverse. Both women and men with different educational backgrounds 
migrated to Taiwan, searching for a better life. Similar to the rest of the Japanese population, 
the majority of Okinawans were associated with either commercial business or public office. 
However, Okinawan female migrants were different from others as many came to Taiwan for 
work whereas it was rare for Japanese mainlanders women to do so(8).  
To understand the background of migration from Okinawa to Taiwan, we need to 
stay away from the conventional understanding of “the developed and civilized metropole” 
and “undeveloped colonies”. In fact, whereas Okinawa remained marginalized within the 
framework of metropolitan Japan, Taipei was heavily invested in by the Japanese government, 
and developed to be one of the most highly modernized cities in the Japanese empire by the 
1920s. Having maintained relative autonomy from the Japanese central government, colonial 
Taiwan was indeed like the “Kingdom of the Government-General”. Whereas the public 
offices in Okinawa were dominated by settlers from the Japanese Main Islands, Okinawans 
utilized their “Japanese status” to get better pay. Henceforth, Okinawans left their homes for 
the colony next door, which was rather modernized and urbanized; there were apparently more 
opportunities in both the commercial world and public offices(9). 
Okinawans considered colonial Taiwan not only as a place for work, but also as a place of 
study. While there was no high school or university in Okinawa, the Government-General in 
Taiwan established middle schools, high schools, and universities where both Taiwanese and 
Japanese students were co-educated. Many Okinawans who were willing to receive tertiary 
education chose to do so in colonial Taiwan, Korea, and Manchukuo. In particular, colonial 
Taiwan was popular because the school fees were relatively cheaper and it was geographically 
closer to home. Okinawa lost a great number of male professionals and students in a tragic 
ground battle in 1945. After the fall of the Japanese empire, Okinawans who had resided in the 
colonies repatriated to Okinawa compensated the paucity of male labor power, and made a 
great contribution in re-building Okinawan society after WWII. 
The Okinawan migration to colonial Taiwan can be interestingly compared to the 
Taiwanese migration to the Guangdong province, which was administered by Japan starting 
in 1905 and Manchukuo, the so-called puppet state, founded in 1932. As mentioned, as the 
Government-General of Taiwan was dominated by Japanese settlers, the Taiwanese were hardly 
able to occupy the higher positions. However, in the Guangdong province and Manchukuo, 
the Taiwanese who were familiar with both the ethnic Han Chinese and Japanese cultures 
(8) Matsuda Hiroko, ‘Moving out from the “Margin”: Imperialism and Migrations from Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan’, 
in Asian Studies Review, vol. 32, 2008.
(9) Ibid.
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were relatively well-treated, given much better access to higher positions, and received a better 
salary. According to Xu Xuechi’s study, one of the earliest Taiwanese migrants, Xie Ji-shi, later 
became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo, and Manchukuo’s ambassador to 
Japan. His success greatly encouraged other Taiwanese to migrate to Manchukuo during the 
1930s. In particular, medical doctors accounted for the biggest majority of Taiwanese migrants 
in Manchukuo, and the public officers and employees of state-owned companies were also 
common occupations for Taiwanese. Some medical doctors opened hospitals and had great 
success over there. Others occupied the highest positions in the Manchukuo government(10).
It was also common for Taiwanese students to study medicine in Manchuria. It is recorded 
that more than a hundred Taiwanese graduated from Manchu Medical College in Guangdong 
province. This should be interestingly compared to the fact that the majority of Okinawan 
students who were willing to become medical doctors went to Taipei Medical College. After 
the war, some of the elite Taiwanese migrants in Manchukuo, including Xie Ji-shi, were arrested 
and executed in China because of their collaboration with imperial Japan. Other elite migrants 
were also persecuted after repatriating to Taiwan, but many survived the dark time of the 
Taiwanese under the rule of the Republic of China, and made elite careers by utilizing their 
pre-war experiences(11).      
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the possibility of comparing different imperial networks in the 
modern world. Debates and discussions of the “new imperial history” are certainly suggested to 
re-consider modern empires other than the British Empire, on the condition that scholars 
should be aware of the subtle differences of racial discourse and institutions that were created 
through history and local contexts. It is also important to consider the outcome of colonial 
migrations from a postcolonial perspective. In other words, scholars need to examine the 
transformation of imperial networks and the circumstances of migrants after the fall of an 
empire. The British and Japanese empires were different not only because the British Empire 
was older and greater, and the British were white supremacists, but also because these two 
empires fell apart very differently, and accordingly the destinies of migrants were highly different.
(10) Xu Xueji, ‘Taiwanjin no “Manshū” taiken’, in Shokuminchi bunka kenkyū: Shiryō to bunseki, vol. 1, 2002.
(11) Ibid.
